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1.  Technical Change in Late Industrializing Economies – Building Conceptual and 
Theoretical Blocks* 
 
1.1. National Innovation Systems and Industrializing Economies 
 
Technical change is a crucial factor to economic growth and development.  A framework 
for the analysis of technical change at the level of national economies - National 
Innovation Systems (NIS)1, introduced recently, has had a strong appeal to those 
interested in understanding the connections between technical change, growth and 
development of late industrializing economies.  There are, at least, three main reasons for 
such an appeal: technical change is at the core of NIS’s analysis; this approach aims at 
explaining the reasons for long lasting differences in the performances of national 
economies; and institutions and history are taken seriously into consideration.  No other 
analytical framework presents these general features, which are so promising for the 
understanding of economic development. 
 
In spite of such high hopes, the existing NIS’s studies of late industrializing economies 
seem to have accomplished very little.2  The main reason for the poor performance of this 
specific use of such a framework of analysis does not rest entirely on the lack of good 
data basis on those countries.  A basic reason for that lies in the NIS’s theoretical 
approach itself.  The NIS theoretical and conceptual framework is not appropriate for 
dealing with the processes of technical change typical of industrializing economies, 
which are extremely different from those of industrialized countries. 
 
The large majority of NIS’s studies are focused primarily on scientific and technical 
activities aimed at innovation, especially, with R&D.  Nelson (1993, p. 518), for instance, 
acknowledges that this was the case in the 15 nations’ studies he coordinated, which 
involved industrialized as well as industrializing economies.  That narrow understanding 
of NIS3 is notionally opposed to the broad definition of NIS, which, in its rather few 
studies, encompasses institutions (and relationships) that influence, directly and 
indirectly, the innovation process.4 
 
The narrow understanding of NIS is particularly inappropriate for the study of 
industrializing economies.  This is so because the process of technical change 
characteristic of these economies is largely shaped outside the realm of those institutions 
that are at the core of the innovation (stricto sensu) process.  The use of the broad 
                                         
* A first version of this paper was presented in the “4th International Conference on Technology Policy and 
Innovation – Learning and Knowledge Networks for Development”, Curitiba, Brazil, August 28-31, 2000. 
This paper is based in the author’s Ph.D. dissertation, “Passive and Active National Learning Systems – A 
Framework to Understand Technical Change in Late Industrializing Economies and Some Evidences from 
a Comparative Study of Brazil and South Korea”, The New School for Social Research, New York, May 
1997.  The author thanks Raul C. dos Santos for comments in an earlier draft. 
1 See on NIS, e.g., Freeman (1988, 1995 and 1999), Nelson (1993), Lundvall (1988 and 1992) and Edquist 
(1997). 
2 Kim’s (1993) study of South Korea could be singled out as just an exception that proves the rule. 
3 Nelson’s (1988) analysis of the US system is a classical example of the narrow approach to NIS. 
4 Freeman’s (1988) analysis of the Japanese system is a good example of a broad approach to NIS. 
 understanding of NIS could still be of little help in dealing with industrializing economies 
if the analysis remains based on the kind of notion of innovation that is, in practice, 
subjacent to the majority of NIS’s studies.  The use of a concept of innovation almost as a 
synonym to technical change is frequent.  In this case, innovation is taken as a process 
that has linkages and feedbacks with and, as a matter of fact, connects all the elements of 
the Schumpeterian triad — invention, innovation (stricto sensu) and diffusion, together 
with the more recent concept of incremental innovation.5  Such an encompassing concept 
could be seen, at first sight, as opening up the door for the analysis of elements of 
technical change that are at the center of the process of technical change of industrializing 
economies, as it is the case, for instance, of diffusion.  However, by undifferentiating 
those elements, the current use of innovation as almost synonymous of technical change 
ends up by hindering any productive use of the broad NIS approach for the study of 
industrializing economies. 
 
Even those NIS’s studies, which are explicitly committed to the broad approach and do 
not use a lax concept of innovation, usually relegate to a lesser position those elements of 
technical change other than innovation (stricto sensu).  The concept of innovation (stricto 
sensu), knowingly or unknowingly, ends up by assuming a central role in those studies.  
When, for instance, aspects related more specifically to diffusion are included, the 
analysis of those aspects is generally concentrated in their roles in fostering or hindering 
the process of innovation (stricto sensu), and not in the role of diffusion in its own 
capacity. 
 
The usual practice of placing R&D institutions, resources and outputs at the center of any 
type of NIS analysis is an indicator of its usual concern with innovation (stricto sensu).  
The frequent use of R&D statistics as a proxy for a wider range of S&T activities is 
acknowledged to be unsatisfactory (Winter, 1987; Bell, 1991; and Freeman, 1992).  
Freeman, for instance, (1994, p. 473) states in this respect that “In some industries and in 
the industrial countries R&D measures are reasonably good surrogate for this wider 
range of activities but in others they are not.”  Freeman’s realization that R&D statistics 
were not good proxies of S&T activities in non-industrial economies were corroborated 
by one of the main findings of a research coming from a different theoretical background: 
an exercise of cross-country growth analysis (Gittleman and Wolff, 1995).  That study 
concluded (ibid., p. 189) that “R&D activity is significant in explaining cross-national 
differences in growth only among the more developed countries.  Among middle income 
and less developed ones, the effects are insignificant.”  We suggest that R&D statistics 
should be good surrogates for technological activities in general only in those industries 
or countries in which innovation (stricto sensu) is the leading form of technical change.6 
 
Therefore, the bias of NIS studies towards innovation (stricto sensu) does not seem to 
                                         
5 The observed difficulties to determine, in the cases of some specific technologies, where each one of these 
elements ends, and where the other begins, are thought to be a good justification for not making a clear-cut 
analytical distinction between them, and, therefore, a good reason to mix them up in a loose concept of 
innovation. 
6 The notion of “leading form of technical change” is used here in the sense of most influential, the 
pacesetter of technological competition, and not necessarily in the sense of the most frequent or the one that 
has the most important direct impact on productivity. 
 have harmful consequences as long as the systems of innovations under scrutiny are of 
advanced industrial countries, i.e., countries where innovation (stricto sensu) is at the 
core of the process of technical change.  However, this is not the case for late 
industrializing or developing economies, i.e., countries in which innovation (stricto 
sensu) has a secondary role, possibly, no role at all, in the process of technical change.7 
 
The simple extension of the use of the National Innovation Systems’ approach to the 
analysis of late industrializing economies is then unwarranted.  It likely impairs the very 
understanding of the nature, pace and direction of the process of technical change of 
those economies, and, therefore, the identification of their determinants, as well as, it 
could induce inappropriate policy prescriptions. 
 
The conceptual and theoretical problems indicated above are the main reasons why the 
high hopes set upon the NIS’ approach as a tool for understanding the connections 
between technical change, growth and the development of late industrializing economies 
became unfulfilled. 
 
However, the general framework of analysis introduced by the NIS’ approach could still 
be some how useful for that purpose as long as it could be detached from those problems. 
 
A preliminary step would be required before moving forward in that direction: to realize 
the differences there are between what Schumpeter has called development in the 
beginning of the twentieth century and what development means nowadays.  For 
Schumpeter, development is understood as the process of economic transformation 
brought about by innovation.  His concept of development could, therefore, be seen, to a 
certain extension, as a background for the whole conception of the National Innovation 
Systems’ approach.  This is so because such an approach is just a tool for the study of a 
country’s ability to generate innovations, which would stands, in Schumpeter sense, for a 
country’s ability to “develop”. 
 
However, Schumpeter’s notion of development, as it was formulated in the “Theory of 
Economic Development”, was much more related to the idea of the capitalist 
development in general, than to the idea of the development of national economies, in 
particular.  If there was any idea of national economies implicit in his formulations, it 
was an idea of development associated specifically with the leading capitalist economies, 
i.e., with those national economies that were leading the process of capitalist 
development by means of their strong innovation process. 
 
The NIS’ approach has contributed by adding up a specific national dimension to the 
Schumpeterian tradition, but it still remain focused on phenomena characteristic of the 
leading capitalist economies. 
                                         
7 Cooper (1992) presents an interesting discussion on the relevance of innovation studies of industrialized 
economies to technology policy in developing countries.  He thinks that this relevance is, at least partially, 
jeopardized by the fact that “there is comparatively little technological innovation taking place there, 
especially if innovation is strictly defined to mean the first commercial introduction of a product or process 
in the international economy” (Cooper 1992, p. 11). 
  
Dealing with the question of development, defined as a departure from underdevelopment 
(a notion established approximately forty years later than Schumpeter’s “Theory of 
Economic Development”), would require a step further. 
 
1.2. National Learning Systems 
 
The industrialization process is what accounts for the emergence of the cleavage between 
developed and underdeveloped countries.  Those countries that were not among the 
pioneer processes of industrialization need to struggle to industrialize in their search for 
development.  Industrialization after the Second Industrial Revolution, however, is a 
significantly different process.  At the core of the specificities of late industrialization 
there is a particular technical change process. 
 
Innovation is the engine of capitalist development as a whole.  Nevertheless, processes of 
technical change led by innovations are usually a privilege of industrialized countries.  
The processes of technical change of industrializing economies are usually limited to the 
absorption and improvement of innovations produced in the industrialized countries. 
 
However, the fundamental distinction between the processes of technical change of 
industrialized and industrializing economies is usually hindered by the current tendency 
towards an increasing conceptual imprecision in the literature on technical change, as 
already indicated.  One of the reasons that are usually utilized as excuse for such an 
imprecision is the growing awareness of the interactive relationships that there exist 
between invention, innovation (stricto sensu), incremental innovation and diffusion.  The 
awareness of such interdependence, however, does not justify an indiscriminate use of 
these concepts.8 
 
In spite of their rich interaction, each one of those forms of technical change presents 
enough differences to justify their independent existence in our conceptual framework.  
Such an understanding is strengthened when one realizes the great differences there exist 
in the processes by which they are created, the diverse capabilities they require, and the 
varied meanings they have for the competitiveness of firms, industries and nations.  The 
preservation of the identity of each one of those concepts is, in general, required.  It is 
particularly crucial, though, for building a specific framework for the analysis of 
technical change in late industrializing countries. 
 
The need to maintain the independent existence of each one of those concepts, however, 
does not get in the way of recognizing the strong association there exist specially between 
diffusion and incremental innovation.  This recognition led us to propose the use of an 
                                         
8 If the distinction between innovation and diffusion, for instance, is misleading, as suggested, for example, 
by Bell and Pavitt (1993, p. 259), why should both concepts be preserved?  If it is not possible to 
distinguish one concept from the other, there would be two  methodological solutions for this imbroglio: 
either only one of the concepts is used, or a third concept replaces both of them.  However, as there is an 
actual need for the preservation of each of them, a third, although inadequate, solution has prevailed: the 
use of both concepts without a clear distinction between them. 
 additional concept that encompasses (but does not replace) both of them — the concept 
of learning.9 
 
Learning, we propose, is the process of technical change achieved by diffusion (in the 
perspective of technology absorption) and incremental innovation.  In other words, 
learning is the absorption of already existing techniques, i.e., the absorption of 
innovations produced elsewhere, and the generation of improvements in the vicinity of 
acquired techniques. 
 
Having settled these basic conceptual definitions, it is possible to go ahead in our effort to 
understand the process of technical change characteristic of late industrializing countries. 
 
The dynamic engine of late industrialization is, then, technological learning, rather than 
innovation.10  Therefore, National Systems of Technical Change of late industrializing 
economies have a crucial common element, which is their condition of technological 
learners.  This is the reason why we propose that the use of the concept of National 
Innovation Systems should be ascribed exclusively to the analysis of cases of advanced 
industrial countries.  For the analysis of the National Systems of Technical Change of 
latecomers, we propose, then, the use of the concept of National Learning System — 
NLS — with all its methodological implications.11  Figure 1 presents a simplified vision 
of the elements of technical change that compose the two basic types of National Systems 
of Technical Change. 
 
                                         
9 The concept of learning is also plagued with imprecision.  Arrow (1962) pioneered a theoretical tradition 
by introducing the concept of learning-by-doing, basically associated with an understanding of technical 
change as a continuous process of acquisition of experience in the production activity.  A myriad of other 
concepts of learning, each one of them referring to a specific form of acquisition of technical skill and 
knowledge, was added to Arrow’s initial concept of learning.  Nowadays there is also a recent tendency 
towards a kind of broad understanding of learning, in which technical change, in general, is interpreted as a 
kind of learning process.  We think, however, that innovation (stricto sensu) could not be seen as the result 
of a simple process of learning, it should rather be associated with the ordinary understanding of something 
like creation, rather than learning.  The process of generating incremental innovation and absorbing 
innovation, however, certainly involves several mechanisms of learning. 
10 The concept of innovation will be, henceforth, used in Schumpeter’s original meaning, instead of 
innovation (stricto sensu), used so far in order to differentiate it from the usual encompassing 
understanding of the concept.  In other words, innovation will, from now on, in this paper, stands for the 
type of technical change achieved by the production of (the first commercial transaction involving) a new 
product, process, system or organization.  Moreover, it should be stressed the fact that the originality 
involved in this definition could never be defined just in terms of a firm, region or country.  The 
introduction, even for the first time, of a technique generated elsewhere in a firm, region or country is just 
absorption (or diffusion), and not innovation in the Schumpeterian sense. 
11 Chapter 2 of Viotti (1997, pp. 33-105) develops a much thorough analysis on the specificities of 
technical change in late industrializing economies, the proposed National Learning Systems’ approach, and 
its methodological implications. 
  
 
The most important implication of such a differentiation is, obviously, the fact that the 
analysis of National Learning Systems should be centered in the activities, institutions, 
and relationships, associated to learning, rather than to innovation.  Absorption12 and 
incremental innovation should, therefore, be the main focuses of studies of NLSs. 
 
1.3. Basic Technological Capabilities of Industrial Firms 
An excursion analyzing firms’ technological capabilities is instrumental for acquiring a 
better understanding of National Learning Systems, i.e., to advance a step further in our 
effort of building conceptual and theoretical blocks for the analysis of technical change in 
late industrializing economies. 
 
The development of countries depends on their firm’s ability to create income, increase 
productivity, compete and grow.  Contrary to the beliefs of conventional economists, and 
according to the understanding of ordinary people, businessmen, Marxists and neo-
Schumpeterians alike, firms differ from one another, and one of the most important 
differences of them are their ability to acquire, assimilate, use, adapt, change and create 
                                         
12 Absorption is just the process of diffusion perceived from the perspective of the recipient of the 
technique.  Contrary to neoclassical understanding, diffusion is not just a matter of contagion.  A technique 
is diffused only when it is effectively assimilated, and this depends on the ability and on the efforts 
developed by the recipient firm, industry or country.  Hence, diffusion, from the perspective of the 
absorber, is something different from diffusion, from the perspective of the diffuser. 
 
 
Figure 1 – National Systems of Technical Change 
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS 
(Industrialized Nations) 
NATIONAL LEARNING SYSTEMS 








 technologies.  The concept of different technological capabilities13 attempts to capture 
that notion of differences in firms’ abilities to carry on technical changes.  That concept is 
very useful for the understanding of the nature, direction and pace of the process of 
technical change that happens not only in firms, but also, in industries, regions or 
countries. 
 
Although a great variety of specific technological capabilities14 can be identified, we 
propose to organize them in three basic categories:15 
· The production capability – the knowledge, skills and other conditions required 
for the process of production; 
· The improvement capability – the knowledge, skills and other conditions required 
for the continuous and incremental upgrading of product design, performance 
features and of process technology; and, 
· The innovation capability – the knowledge, skills and other conditions required 
for the creation of new technologies, i.e., major changes in the design and core 
features of products and production processes.16 
 
In order to give a much more concrete notion about the meaning of those categories, we 
elaborated Table 1, which presents some technical functions performed by industrial 
firms that are understood as typical of each one of the three basic technological 
capabilities.  There is no need to scrutinize each one of the technical functions and the 
reasons by which they are related to a particular technological capability, they are 
relatively obvious. 
 
                                         
13 The concept of technological capability was developed in a number of different ways by several authors 
of the Indigenous Incremental Learning Literature – IILL, as Erber (1983) has called it.  See on that 
concept, for instance, Bell (1984), Dahlman, Ross-Larson and Westphal (1987), Westphal et al. (1990), 
Enos (1991), and Lall (1987, 1990, and 1992a, b, c). 
14 OECD (1992, p. 262) stresses the fact that the notion of technological capability: “goes well beyond 
engineering and technical know-how to include knowledge of organizational structures and procedures as 
much as knowledge of behavioural patterns, e.g. of workers and customers. Firms need certain 
complementary assets and capabilities in order to create, mobilize and improve their technological 
capabilities, among which may be noted organizational flexibility, finance, quality of human resources, 
sophistication of the support services and of the information management and coordination capabilities.” 
15 The IILL’s authors used to stress the particular type of technological capability required for the 
establishment of new, and the expansion or modernization of old industrial plants.  This capability was not 
considered to constitute one of the basic ones. 
16 These characterizations of each technological capability draw heavily on OECD (1992, p. 262), in spite 
of the facts that they were christened here, and a fourth capability adopted by OECD, related to project 
investment, was deemed not relevant to this stage of the work, as pointed before. 
 Table 1 
BASIC TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AND TYPICAL TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS 
OF INDUSTRIAL FIRMS 
 
 TYPICAL TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS 
PRODUCTION CAPABILITY 
(Knowledge, skills and other 
conditions required for the 
process of production) 
Assimilation of process/product technology 
Passive incremental innovations 
· Minor adaptation to local conditions (of infrastructure, goods 
and services supply, human resources, and product demand) 
· Balancing the process/line of production 
· Simple debugging and routine maintenance 
· Inventory control 
· Management of inputs procurement and output sales 
· Quality control of final products 
· Sporadic training 
IMPROVEMENT CAPABILITY 
(Knowledge, skills and other 
conditions required for the 
continuous and incremental 
upgrading of product design and 
performance features and of 
process technology) 
Mastering of process/product technology 
Active incremental innovation 
· Major adaptation to local conditions (of infrastructure, goods 
and services supply, human resources, and product demand) 
· Shop-floor experimentation 
· Preventive maintenance 
· Networking with suppliers and consumers 
· Total quality type of control systems 
· Permanent training 
· Product/process improvement 
· Equipment stretching and adaptation 
· Regular search for outside knowledge and skills, including 
benchmarking, copying, imitation and reverse engineering 
· Science and technology links 
· In-house R&D 
INNOVATION CAPABILITY 
(Knowledge, skills and other 
conditions required for the 
creation of new technologies, 
i.e., major changes in the design 
and core features of products and 
production processes) 
Innovation of product/process technology 
· Process/product innovation 
· In-house R&D 
· Basic research 
· Cooperative R&D 
· Licensing own technology to others 
Note: Except for cases of innovation startups, the technical functions typical of the technological capability 
of innovation usually subsume those of improvement, as well as, these last ones comprise those of 
production. 
 What require much closer attention are the two different concepts of incremental 
innovation utilized in Table 1.  The importance to differentiate incremental innovation 
from innovation, itself, was already pointed out.  However, even when a clear definition 
of incremental innovation is utilized, there remains room for some conceptual 
misunderstandings.  This is so because it is possible to identify incremental innovations 
that are generated by two different processes of learning. 
 
There is a type of incremental innovation that is a consequence of a process of learning-
by-doing.  This process is called by Bell (1984, p. 190) as “doing-based learning”, and he 
indicated (ibid., p. 189) that it has three remarkable properties: it arises passively, little or 
no explicit action is required to capture it; it is virtually automatic; and it is practically 
costless, a kind of free by-product from carrying on with production.  The outcomes of 
“doing-based-learning” should be called, we propose, passive incremental innovations, 
and these are clearly associated with just the production capability. 
 
There is, however, another type of incremental innovation that arises from a completely 
different process of learning, the one that is a consequence of deliberate efforts and 
investments in technology.  Bell (1984, p. 190) called this process as “non-doing-based 
learning”.  We propose to call the outcome of “non-doing-based-learning” as active 
incremental innovation, and this is a kind of hallmark of the improvement capability. 
 
Another dimension should, at this point, be added to our framework of analysis.  There 
are some forms of technology absorption that are prone to generate more opportunities 
for active incremental innovations than others.  Forms of technological absorption that 
follow the pathway of minimal technological effort (the “black-box” approach), like, for 
instance, turnkey projects, license agreements and foreign direct investment, generate 
mainly opportunities for passive incremental innovations.  We characterize those forms 
of absorption as passive absorption. 
 
This type of absorption, which targets the assimilation of almost only just the abilities 
needed for the establishment of the capacity to produce certain goods or services, 
generates opportunities of learning that hardly go beyond the simple development of 
technological capabilities of production. 
 
Forms of technological absorption that require a more intense technological effort, as, for 
instance, imitation and reverse engineering, are likely to produce not only a deeper 
mastering of the absorbed technologies, but also a richer array of opportunities for active 
incremental innovation.  We characterize those forms of technological absorption as 
active absorption.  This type of absorption generates opportunities of learning that 
usually go far beyond production capability, it is one of the bases for the development of 
the technological capability for improvement.  Table 2 presents some examples of 




 Table 2 
EXAMPLES OF PASSIVE AND ACTIVE FORMS OF TECHNOLOGY ABSORPTION 
 
 FORMS OF TECHNOLOGY ABSORPTION 
PASSIVE ABSORPTION 
· Investment projects by means of turnkey contracts or direct 
foreign investment 
· Technology licensing 
· Purchasing of equipment packages linked with technical 
assistance from the capital goods supplier 
ACTIVE ABSORPTION 
· Investment projects progressively under firm’s control 
· Technology and equipment procurement progressively under 
firm’s control 
· Imitation 
· Reverse engineering 
· Copying 
 
Some evidences have shown, however, that a particular form of technological absorption 
could have different meanings when it is fitted in a firms’ long-term technological 
strategy.  An apparently passive form of absorption could occasionally be accompanied 
by a deliberate effort for mastering the technology being absorbed.  In other words, some 
times a passive form of absorption could just represent an initial and deliberate step 
towards active learning.  This seems to be the case, for instance, of some large Korean 
conglomerates that deliberately utilized OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) 
agreements as just an initial step in an aggressive and active pathway towards 
technological learning, as described in Amsden (1989). 
 
After this relatively large process of building theoretical and conceptual blocks for 
analyzing technical change in late industrializing economies, Table 3 tries to present a 
kind of summing up of the relationships there are between each one of the basic 




TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIES 
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 Passive Active Passive Active   
Production X  X   Passive Learning 
Improvement X X X X  Active Learning 
Innovation X X X X X Innovation 
Note: The symbol “X” (“”) denotes the existence (lack) of the corresponding element of technical change. 
  
1.4. From Firms’ Technological Capabilities to Passive and Active National 
Learning Systems 
 
The empirical evidences based on the few available case studies on technical change at 
firm level in industrializing economies17 give some important clues about the typical 
technological capabilities of those firms.  First of all, not even one firm among those, 
which were studied, presented effective innovation capability, in the sense defined 
before.  Several case studies identified the existence of very poor processes of learning, a 
technical change process limited to the simple assimilation of production capability.  One 
of these is an influential study by Bell et al. (1982) about an industrial plant for the 
production of galvanized steel sheets in Thailand, which was considered by the authors to 
be an example of failure in terms of technological accumulation.18 
 
There are reasons to believe that the simple assimilation of production capability is the 
most typical case of firms’ technological strategy in developing economies.  We 
characterize this kind of process of technical change as a passive learning strategy.  In 
other words, the passive learning strategy is the one in which the technological effort 
developed is essentially aimed at the absorption of production capability. 
 
Other studies have, however, revealed the existence of advanced processes of learning in 
which firms go much beyond the simple absorption of production capability.19  The 
technological effort associated with it reflects a commitment also to develop the 
improvement capability.  We characterize as active learning strategy the technological 
strategy that aims at the mastery of production capability together with the improvement 
capability. 
 
It should be recalled that each one of those studies emphasized the fact that these cases of 
successful learning, i.e., of active learning, were the result of a conscious commitment to 
technological accumulation.  Referring to some of those case studies, Bell (1984, p. 206), 
for instance, concluded, in this respect, that 
“case-studies like those of Sabato (1973), Sercovitch (1980), Enos (1982), and Dahlman 
and Fonseca (1978) (...) emphasize the role of deliberate, aggressive investment in the 
                                         
17 The most important studies were the result of a large program of study of Latin American firms 
coordinated by Katz.  See, for instance, Dahlman (1978), Maxwell (1977), and Katz and Albin (1979).  The 
main achievements of that program were condensed in Katz (1987).  For an Indian case study see Lall 
(1987).  For surveys of such studies see, for example, Dahlman and Westphal (1982), Bell et al. (1982), and 
Dahlman, Ross-Larsen and Westphal (1987). 
18 The authors of the study (Bell et al., 1982, p. 150) concluded their analysis of that firm in the following 
way: “One simple conclusion emerges from this analysis.  Over a period of at least about nine years this 
infant industrial firm did not improve any of four important aspects of the production efficiency of three 
lines which produced its basic standard product.  Nor did operating efficiency improve following the 
introduction of the two new vintages of capital equipment.  In terms of production efficiency, the firm seems 
to have remained technologically stagnant during this period.  There were no technically fixed limits which 
prevented minor modifications and improvements of these lines.” 
19 Beyond the case studies by the IILL literature, Amsden’s (1989) classical study of South Korea gives 
several examples of firms (Chaebols) with amazingly intense processes of such a kind of advanced 
learning. 
 accumulation of technology-capital — investment that is made in the context of coherent, 
long-term strategies, and in the light of “hard-nosed,” but social rather than private, 
perspectives on the returns to that investment.” 
 
Cooper (1992, p. 15) also arrived at the similar conclusion that (what we call in this 
paper) active learning could not be seen as a natural and common behavior of firms from 
late industrializing countries: 
... in the absence of appropriate external institutional conditions learning process may ... 
fail ... (...) The failure of learning processes in developing countries is in fact quite 
common.  It is reflected in what is often called a “black-box” approach to production 
technology encountered quite often in developing country firms which receive technology 
via license agreements: firms may be unconcerned about how the technology works, 
provided only that they are able to produce with it.  There are also reasons to expect that 
firms in developing countries may underinvest in learning processes. 
 
Those conclusions show not only the notion that the identified cases of active learning 
were the result of deliberate and aggressive commitment to technological learning, but 
also that overcoming the limitations of passive learning by firms depends on external 
conditions. 
 
In principle, any individual firm is free to choose its technological strategy, being it 
passive or active learning, or even innovation.  Therefore, on an individual basis it would 
be perfectly possible, in a certain sense, to think of firms’ technological strategy as just a 
matter of choice.  However, the particular strategy that prevails in a country20 is a 
completely different phenomenon.  It depends on the nature of the National System of 
Technical Change in which firms are embedded. 
 
Moreover, those accounts of cases of successful learning firms seem to favor the 
understanding that the natural strategy that prevails in late industrializing economies is 
generally the passive one.  Overcoming the passive strategy seems to be possible only 
where there are the “appropriate external institutional conditions”, which allows for 
“deliberate, aggressive investment in the accumulation of technology-capital” with some 
kind of “social rather than private, perspectives on the returns to that investment.”  In 
other words, there are some suggestive clues indicating that the simple functioning of the 
market incentive mechanisms are prone to favor just the passive learning strategy in late 
industrializing economies.  To foster the prevalence of the active learning strategy in 
these economies seems to be a task for a more complex set of institutions, relationships 
                                         
20 The question of aggregation involved in the determination of what type of firms’ strategy dominates in a 
national economy is not a minor question.  Pavitt’s (1984) identification of sectoral patterns of technical 
change should be taken as a strong indication that there are also structural reasons for the simultaneous 
coexistence off different technological strategies amongst manufacturing sectors.  Obviously, there should 
happen to exist different firms’ strategies living together in any national economy at any moment in time. 
Unfortunately, then, the question of which technology strategy prevails could not be reduced to the mere 
identification of the strategy that is followed by the larger number of firms.  The solution for such a 
question should be searched for in the behavior of the leading firms (i.e., those which set the pace of 
competition and that, usually, are also the best practice firms) of all sectors, and mainly in sectors other 
than the supplier-dominated ones. 
 and incentives. 
 
Summing up, it is possible to understand the three different natures of National Systems 
of Technical Change from the perspective of firms’ technological strategies.  Those 
economies in witch the processes of technical change are dominated by firms’ innovation 
strategy should be characterized as National Innovation Systems, whereas economies 
dominated by active or passive learning strategies should be characterized, respectively, 




Figure 2 presents a simple representation of National Learning Systems of active and 
passive nature by means of showing the different types of absorption and incremental 
innovation that characterize them.  Passive National Learning Systems are basically 
limited to the type of incremental innovation that is a kind of free by-product from 
carrying on with production (i.e., passive incremental innovation), and the type of 
technological absorption that follow the pathway of minimal technological effort (i.e., 
passive absorption).  Active National Learning Systems add up to the forms of technical 
change typical of passive learning, indicated above, those forms of incremental 
innovation that are consequence of a deliberate technological effort (i.e. active 
incremental innovation), as well as the forms of absorption that require a more intense 
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 technological effort (i.e., active absorption). 
 
Concluding this brief excursion through the analysis of some scattered micro evidences 
of the technological behaviors typical of late industrializing economies, two 
considerations on further research must be stressed.  First, the growing importance of the 
national systems’ analytical approach should not inhibit further research on firms’ case 
studies.  As a matter of fact, the promotion of further studies of this kind is crucial for the 
advancement of the effective understanding of the technical change process of those 
economies.  Second, firms’ case studies are not substitute for the direct inquiry on the 
general features of the technical change process at the national level, and also the analysis 
of the institutions and relationships that shape such a process. 
 
The second part of this paper develops an analysis of macro evidences of the most 
successful industrializing economies of Latin America — Brazil — and of East Asia — 
South Korea.  There are reasons to believe that the greatly different recent performances 
of these two economies are rooted in two significantly different processes of technical 
change.  Those differences do not seem to constitute simply national nuances among 
processes of technical change typical of late industrializing economies, i.e., they do not 
seem to be just differences between National Learning Systems.  They seem to reveal 
National Learning Systems of different natures.  The comparative analysis of the two 
economies will investigate the hypothesis of the existence of actual cases of National 
Learning Systems of a passive and an active nature. 
 
2. The Natures of the National Learning Systems of Brazil and South Korea 
 
Some basic macro-indicators will be used to support the assumption that Korea was 
successful in its transition towards an active learning system, whereas Brazil was not.  
Those indicators can be organized under four different categories: the national patterns of 
education and training of the labor force; national patterns of technology acquisition; 
national patterns of commitment of resources to technological learning; and indicators on 
the outcome of the national technological effort. 
 
2.1 The National Patterns of Labor Force Education and Training 
 
Indicators of the national patterns of labor force education and training are presented in 
Table 4.  Korean, like developed countries, has overcome, in practical terms, adult 
illiteracy.  Brazil, however, still shows a rate of adult illiteracy at 16.7 per cent in 1995, 
which means that a sixth part of the Brazilian potential labor force is not prepared to 
make a meaningful contribution to technological learning.  Korea made an extraordinary 
effort to improve secondary education during the last decades and achieved near 
universality in 1993 for their population in the age group between 12 and 17 years old.  
That same year, less than half of Brazilians in the corresponding age group were enrolled 
in secondary school.  Furthermore, the quality of the Brazilian secondary education 
ranked very poorly, amongst the worst ranked countries in the world, whereas the Korean 
was among the best, as it was inferred by a 1991 international standardized tests in 
science and mathematics (IAEP/ETS 1991, and NSB 1996). 
  
Table 4 
NATIONAL LEARNING SYSTEMS – BRAZIL AND SOUTH KOREA 
Selected Indicators on  
LABOR FORCE EDUCATION AND TRAINING  
Indicator Brazil South Korea 
Adult illiteracy (1995) 16.7 2.0 
Percentage of age group in secondary education (1993) 43 93 
Performance of secondary students in 1991 international 
standardized tests in science and mathematics 
Amongst the 
world’s worst scores 
The world’s best 
scores 
Percentage of age group in tertiary education (1993) 11.5 48.2 
Number of tertiary students per 100.000 inhabitants (1992) 1,079 4,253 
Percentage of first university degrees in engineering (1992) 7 18 
Tertiary students abroad (as % of those at home) (1985-92) 0.1 2.7 






Source: Viotti, Eduardo, Passive and Active National Learning Systems, 1997 (Tables 2; 3; 4, and pp. 184-
185; 187-188; 186, and 192-193). 
Note: Number between parentheses corresponds to the year of the data. 
 
 
The Korean effort in improving third level education is striking.  Approximately half of 
the corresponding age group was enrolled in tertiary education in 1993, a ratio of 
enrollment that is even slightly better than that of the average developed country.  
Approximately a ninth of the corresponding age group of Brazilians were enrolled in 
tertiary education in 1993.  The number of tertiary students per 100 thousand inhabitants 
in Brazil (1.079) is approximately a fourth of that of Korea (4.253).  Moreover, the 
proportionally small number of tertiary students in Brazil seems to be inadequately 
distributed by fields.  Brazil has a low proportion of university or college bachelors in the 
fields that are most important to the needs of a late industrializing economy.  Engineers 
play a crucial role in the process of absorption of foreign technology, making it 
operational, and improving it.  Active learning requires a relatively large pool of well-
educated and trained engineers.  Brazil, however, had a very low percentage of its total 
first university degrees in engineering in 1992, only 7 percent, whereas such a percentage 
in Korea was 18 percent.  
 
The patterns of national labor force education and training depicted by the analyzed 
indicators shown that Korea was able to rapidly and effectively develop a well educated 
and trained labor force, fulfilling, thus, such a requirement for a successful transition 
towards an active NLS.  Brazil, on the other hand, in spite of important improvements in 
the last decades, remained with a relatively poorly educated and trained labor force, 
which hindered its prospect for a successful transition for an active NLS. 
  
A well educated labor-force in general, and, in particular, a large pool of qualified 
engineers, are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for overcoming a passive learning 
strategy.  Their effective and efficient engagement in a national technological effort is 
also essential.  From a different perspective, “human capital” would not become an 
effective technological absorber or improver (not even a factor of production) without its 
effective engagement in productive or in science and technological activities.  Though 
education is a necessary condition for the effective acquisition and improvement of 
technologies, it is not a sufficient one.  Good education does not ensure, for instance, 
direct access to technologies of production.  The inquiry will, then, be directed, first, to 
assessing the national patterns of technology acquisition, second, to the national patterns 
of commitment of resources to technological learning. 
 
2.2. The National Patterns of Technological Acquisition 
 
A good idea about the nature of the process of technological absorption could be given by 
how late industrializing economies acquire technology.  These economies have three 
major sources of formal acquisition of technology: technology embodied in capital goods 
imported from advanced industrial countries — CGI; technology brought about by 
foreign direct investments — FDI; and the direct purchase of technology by means of 
foreign technology licensing and technical assistance — DPT. 
 
Statistics about those different ways of acquiring technology are scarce, difficult to 
assemble, and could be affected by differences in national legal regulations.  In spite of 
these difficulties, the sparse and not entirely compatible data gathered in Table 5 could 
give some idea about the Brazilian and Korean patterns of technology acquisition. 
 
Assuming that the values of the flows of foreign direct investment, capital goods imports, 
and direct purchase of technology keep a certain correlation with their technological 
contents, the data presented in Table 5, together with some other information presented in 
Viotti (1997, Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11), give an indication of the relative importance of 
each one of these flows for each country.  The overall picture could be summed up in 
three basic stylized facts about technology acquisition in Brazil and Korea: 
· The most important source of foreign technology in Korea was, and continues to 
be, imports of capital goods, while such a source plays a relatively secondary role 
in Brazil;21 
· Foreign Direct Investment plays a major role in the Brazilian acquisition of 
foreign technology, and a minor role in Korea; 
· Foreign licensing and technical consultancy was of relatively small importance 
for both Korea and Brazil; however, its importance is increasing at a very fast 
pace for Korea. 
 
 
                                         
21 Note that Korean imports of capital goods as a ratio of its gross domestic investment shown in Table 5 is 
larger than one.  This is explained by the fact that Korea re-exports an important share of the imported 
capital goods as components of exported goods. This is the case, for instance, of naval engines. 
 Table 5 
NATIONAL LEARNING SYSTEMS – BRAZIL AND SOUTH KOREA 
Selected Indicators on  
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION 
Indicator Brazil South Korea 
Imports of capital goods as a ratio of the GDI (1987) 0.259 1.066 
Foreign direct investment up to 1986 US$ 27.4 billion U$ 3.6 billion 
Direct purchase of technology 
(1984-1988) 
US$ 827.8 million 
(1982-1986) 
US $1,517 million 
Imports of US industrial processes (1993) US$ 7 million US$ 287 million 
(Second only to Japan) 
Imports of Japanese technology (1993)  – a ¥ 53 billion 
(Second only to US) 
Source: Viotti, Eduardo, Passive and Active National Learning Systems, 1997 (Tables 6, 7, 8; 9; 10, 11, 
and p. 215). 
Notes:  GDI stands for Gross Domestic Investment.  Numbers between parentheses indicate the years to 
which the data corresponds.  (a) Brazilian imports of technology from Japan in 1993 were not 
remarkable enough to be shown in the table of Japanese exports of technology. 
 
 
The great importance imports of capital goods play in the Korean process of technical 
change suggests that the acquisition of innovations generated in advanced industrial 
countries, which are imported embodied in new vintages of capital goods, is playing a 
fundamental role in keeping Korea in a dynamic track of technological absorption.  This 
feature seems to have been very fortunate for the Korean system in the period of the 
information and communication technological revolution.  The very rapid transformation 
of the technological frontier in the world seems to have impaired the functioning of the 
fertile interaction mechanisms that a larger domestic basis of capital goods industry 
should, otherwise, have given Brazil. 
 
With respect to the other formal source of foreign technology, foreign direct investment, 
Brazil seems to be a champion.  Brazil received US$ 27.4 billion of foreign direct 
investment until 1986, whereas Korea received only U$ 3.6 billion.  Dahlman and 
Frischtak (1993, p. 433) estimate that Brazil had the largest stock of foreign capital 
among developing country.  The Korean Exchange Bank estimated that Korea’s stock of 
DFI in 1983 was only 7 per cent of that of Brazil (Kim, 1993, p. 360).  There are 
assessments that in earlier periods, in 1963, “the MNCs were entirely absent from the 
local [Korean] scene” (Lim, 1982, p. 139, quoted from Evans, 1987, p. 207). 
 
According to Viotti’s (1997, Tables 6 and 8, and Graphs 8 and 9) estimates, FDI 
represented in Korea (up to 1986) less than 3 percent of the total value flow of the three 
“conventional” sources of foreign technologies, whereas it represented 44 percent in 
Brazil (in the period between 1987 and 1992).  The relatively minimum role DFI plays in 
the process of technical change in Korea is further illustrated by the fact that foreign 
 investors in Korea usually participate as minority shareholders in Korean and foreign 
joint ventures, contrary to what happens in Brazil (Evans 1987, p. 208). 
 
This fact reflects “... Korea’s explicit policy of promoting its “independence” from 
multinationals in management control” (Kim, 1993, p. 360), a policy which transformed 
foreign investment within the country in not only a mater of private decision, but also a 
matter of adequacy to the Korean industrial policy, as government approval for each 
foreign investment was required (Kim and Dahlman, 1992, p. 451).  The recent process 
of progressive economic liberalization in Korea seems to have not yet changed 
significantly the secondary role of FDI as a source of foreign technology, nor the 
secondary role of multinational corporations in the Korean industrial arena. 
 
The singular importance of FDI in Brazil is also a consequence of an explicit industrial 
policy.  Dahlman and Frischtak (1993, p. 417), for instance, indicate that “One of the key 
elements of the industrial development strategy [of Brazil] was to induce foreign firms to 
set up manufacturing facilities in Brazil.  This consisted not only of protecting the local 
market but also of offering significant subsidies and special treatment for foreign 
investors.”22 
 
With the exception of few segments where foreign capital was not welcomed in Brazil 
(exceptions that have almost entirely vanished with the new constitution of 1988 and the 
subsequent reforms), foreign firms are present in almost all industrial segments in Brazil.  
Moreover, at least one of the most important transnational corporations is present in 
Brazil in virtually each one of all the most dynamic industrial segments (defining 
dynamism, here, in both commercial and technological terms) (Bielschowsky and 
Stumpo, 1996, p. 174).  Foreign subsidiaries were estimated to be responsible for 33 
percent of the whole industrial sales in the Brazilian domestic market, and for 44 percent 
of industrial exports, during 1990 (Bielschowsky and Stumpo, 1996, p. 174).  Such a 
share of the domestic market for manufactures is no match to any other industrializing 
economy in the world, with the possible exception of Singapore (ibid., p. 174).  By 
contrast, Kim and Dahlman’s (1992, p. 443) appraisal was that direct foreign investment 
“had a minimal effect on Korean economy.” 
 
In conclusion, there is not the slightest doubt about the existence of very different 
national patterns of reliance on direct foreign investment as a source of technology 
supply in Brazil and Korea, and these patterns are mainly a consequence of their specific 
industrial policies.  Conventional wisdom usually thinks of multinational corporations as 
a privileged agent of technological transference to late industrializing economies.  
However, it seems that FDI usually ensures just the absorption of production 
capabilities, i.e., FDI generally does not contributes for the development of an active 
learning strategy. 
 
                                         
22 Dahlman and Frischtak (1993, p. 417) also indicate that as early as 1960 “... foreign subsidiaries 
accounted for more than 50% of the capital goods producers, 70% of chemicals (except petrochemicals), 
90% of pharmaceuticals, and 100% of the nascent automobile industry.” 
 With the usual exception of adaptations for the domestic conditions, local branches of 
multinational corporations typically rely on their headquarters for providing for their 
needs of technology.  The introduction in a late industrializing economy of a new 
industrial plant by a multinational corporation (MNC) frequently contributes to the 
modernization of the country’s productive apparatus.  However, this usually does good 
just for the upgrading of the country’s technological capability of production.  It usually 
does not necessarily do any good for the country’s capability of improvement or 
innovation.  It may well be that it does some harm because of the easy way the local 
branches of MNCs have to respond to local competitive pressures and opportunities by 
means of upgrading their production capability with the help of their headquarters.  That 
reliance on a kind of “just-in-time” supply of production technologies, not only, renders 
unnecessary the technological effort of the local branch to build improvement or 
innovation capabilities, but could also inhibit the same type of effort by the local 
competitors due to the unfair competition it represents. 
 
This dismaying role of FDI for the technological development of late industrializing 
economies could be one of the reasons for the very different performances Brazil and 
Korea present in this field.  The macro-evidences of commitment of resources to 
technological learning, as well as, the outcome of the national technological efforts of 
Brazil and Korea (which will be analyzed in the next sections of this paper) seem to 
corroborate this interpretation.  In other words, the Brazilian pattern of deep reliance on 
FDI seems to be related to the predominance of a passive learning strategy in Brazil, 
whereas the Korean pattern of very small reliance on FDI seems to be related to the 
predominance of an active learning strategy in that economy. 
 
The third stylized fact about formal acquisition of technology refers to the direct purchase 
of technology. In both countries, the least important source of technology among the 
three “conventional” ones was the direct purchase of technology — DPT.  Up to 1986, 
DPT represented in Korea just one sixtieth (1/60) of the total value flow of the three 
“conventional” sources of technology (Viotti 1997, Table 6 and Graph 8), whereas in 
Brazil it represented (between 1987 and 1992) less than one thirtieth (1/30) (ibd., Tables 
7, 8, 9 and Graph 9).  Therefore, the role of formal contracts of technology transfer was 
remarkably unimportant in comparison to all the three “conventional” sources in both 
countries until some years ago.  One of the reasons for such a small relevance of direct 
purchase of technology in those countries was their industrial policies.  Inspired by the 
findings of the Technological Dependence Literature, both countries have established 
strict controls on the direct purchase of technologies.  Such a feature of their industrial 
policies was designed to improve the bargaining position of national firms, to curb 
restrictive business clauses tied to technology transfer contracts, and, especially in the 
Brazilian case, to minimize foreign exchange outflow (see Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993, 
pp. 429-432, and Kim, 1993, p. 360). 
 
The way each country compensated for such a minimum reliance on direct purchase of 
disembodied technology was, however, very dissimilar.  The first important difference 
was the relatively strong reliance of Korea on capital goods imports and of Brazil on 
direct foreign investment, already addressed.  However, the second, and possibly much 
 more important, was the different role played in each country by forms of technology 
absorption other than those three “conventional” ones. 
 
Those other forms of technology absorption could assume a wide variety, such as 
imitation; copying; reverse engineering; hiring skilled personnel; learning from 
machinery suppliers and independent consultants; overseas training of engineers, 
managers and also of skilled workers for apprenticeship at the factory floor.  Because 
these forms are necessarily associated to a deep technological effort, it usually 
contributes to a superior mastery of process or product technologies, and, therefore, 
creates a basis for further improvements.  These other forms of technology acquisition, 
which we called active absorption in the previous section, are hardly quantifiable and 
comparable.  The literature on Brazil and Korea, however, presents scattered, but 
consistent evidences that the reliance on active absorption was much more important in 
Korea than in Brazil. 
 
Capital goods imports, direct foreign investment, and direct purchase of technology 
ensures just the development of the technological capabilities of production — the only 
technological capability a passive learner usually develops.  It should be noted, however, 
that overcoming the limitations of passive learning is not just a matter of reliance on 
“unconventional” forms of technology acquisition.  An active learning strategy is not just 
a matter of substitution of “unconventional” for “conventional” sources of technology 
acquisition; it is rather a matter of complementarity.  In other words, the cleavage 
between passive versus active learning is not a matter of alternative reliance on 
technology imports versus domestic technology development.  It is rather a matter of 
complementarity between technology imports (i.e., passive and active absorption) and 
domestic technological improvements (i.e., the effective development of improvement 
capabilities).  Such a complementarity was a key element in the technological strategy of 
those countries that were catching up from a position behind the technological frontier, as 
it was the case of Germany in the nineteenth century and Japan in the twentieth century 
(Bell and Cassiolato, 1993, pp. 50-54). 
 
In 1993, Korea rose to became the second buyer of technology in US and Japan, i.e., 
Korea purchased more technology in Japan and the US than any other industrialized or 
industrializing country in the world, but the two largest industrialized economies 
themselves.  In 1993, whereas Korea had a 10 percent share of the U.S. exports of 
industrial processes, Brazil had a share 40 times smaller (0.25 %) in the market that is its 
largest supplier of technology (NSB 1996, pp. 6-2).  Brazilian imports of technology 
from Japan were not remarkable enough to be shown in the table in which Korea appears 
as responding for 11.5 percent of Japanese exports of technology (AIST, 1996, p. 36).  
The recent very high Korean expenditures on imported technologies, combined with still 
higher expenditures on engineering and R&D, seem to indicate that this country is 
imitating the Japanese postwar pattern of catching up.  In contrast, the relatively very 
small Brazilian expenditures on technology imports were not compensated by a stronger 
reliance on domestic technological effort, as it will be shown ahead. 
 
 
 2.3. The National Patterns of Commitment of Resources to Technological Learning 
 
The focus of analysis now turns to the third kind of macro-evidences on the national 
systems of Korea and Brazil: their national patterns of commitment of resources to 
technological learning.23  The actual and meaningful commitment of resources to the 
technological effort is a necessary condition for mastering acquired technologies, and, at 
the same time, for developing capabilities to improve them, in other words, it is a 
necessary condition for active learning.  The national commitment of resources to 
technological learning could be inferred from the national expenditure in R&D, the 
proportions of these resources that are expended at productive enterprises, as well as the 
size of the public financing for industry’s R&D.  The relative number of scientists and 
engineers effectively engaged in R&D activities, and the relative proportion of those 
directly working for the private sector, are other vital indicators.  Table 6 presents these 




NATIONAL LEARNING SYSTEMS – BRAZIL AND SOUTH KOREA 
Selected Indicators on  
COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES TO THE TECHNOLOGICAL EFFORT 
Indicator Brazil South Korea 
















Government preferential financing for industry’s 
R&D 
US$ 810 million 
(1973-1989) 
US$ 848 million 
(1987) 
Scientists and engineers engaged in R&D  

















Source: Viotti, Eduardo, Passive and Active National Learning Systems, 1997 (Tables 13; 14; and p. 226). 
Note: Numbers between parentheses indicate the years to which the data corresponds. 
 
 
Korean and Brazilian expenditures on R&D present very different patterns.  In the 
beginnings of the 1990’s the Brazilian share of its GNP devoted to R&D was just 0.4%, 
whereas Korea expenditure was more than 5 times larger, 2.1%.  As a matter of fact, by 
the year 1991, Korea was leading all developing countries in R&D expenditures, as a 
                                         
23 This approach is related with what Soete (1981) called the “technology-input” type of measures of 
technological activities, in opposition to the “technology-output” type, which will be addressed in the 
following section of this paper. 
 percentage of GNP, and also surpassed OECD countries like Spain, Italy, Austria, 
Denmark or Finland (Lall, 1992c, p. 143). 
 
The analysis of the composition of R&D expenditures is also of great importance. Similar 
quantitative expenditures on R&D could involve different qualities of expenditures.  This 
understanding is helpful, not only to grasp differences between industrializing and 
industrial countries, but, also, to grasp differences among different stages of late 
industrialization.  Kim (1993) and Kim and Dahlman (1992) stress the fact that Korean 
technological development has changed significantly in the 1980’s, and they point the 
progressive relevance of research (R) in the composition of its R&D as one of the 
important changes. 
 
Brazil seems to remain, during the 1980’s and beyond, in a stage in which R&D, and 
especially R, remains largely irrelevant to its industrialization.  There are strong 
evidences that a large part of its yet relatively small technological effort is irrelevant to 
the needs of Brazilian industry, because it is largely divorced from productive activities.  
As Table 6 indicates, government supported the large majority (81.9%) of R&D outlays 
in 1994, and the productive enterprises were directly responsible for a small part of the 
total R&D expenditure (18.1%).  By contrast, the situation in Korea was symmetrically 
divergent.  Productive enterprises were responsible for 82.4 per cent of the total 
expenditure on R&D, in 1992; approximately the same proportion the Brazilian 
government is accounted for in 1994 (81.9%).  Therefore, the technological effort of the 
Korean industry, as it could be inferred from expenditures on R&D as a percentage of 
GNP, is approximately 25 times that of the Brazilian industry. 
 
The relevance of such an effort of Korean industry is one of the reasons for the 
competitive edge attained by national Korean enterprises.  At the same time, the Korean 
reliance on mainly national enterprises is one of the reasons for such a high level of 
domestic technological effort.  However, such a performance was not only a consequence 
of market incentives and firm strategy, but also a result of Korean industrial policy.  The 
Korean government has played a major role in stimulating industry’s investment on R&D 
through direct R&D subsidy, tax incentives, and, mainly, preferential financing (Kim, 
1993, p. 372).  Kim (1993, p. 373) estimates that the total amount of public financing, 
mostly in the form of preferential loans, accounted for 64% of total R&D expenditure in 
manufacturing in 1987. 
 
There was not a similar policy for stimulating industry’s investment in R&D in Brazil.  
The only Brazilian institution devoted to financing industrial R&D — FINEP 
(“Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos S. A.”) — had a relatively small quantitative 
importance in fostering it.  Dahlman and Frischtak (1993, p. 434) estimate that FINEP’s 
financing operations during 17 years (from 1973 to 1989) represented an accumulated 
amount of only approximately US$ 810 million.  By contrast, Kim (1993, p. 373) 
indicates that Korean preferential financing for industry’s R&D amounted to a similar 
value (US$ 848 million) just in one year (1987). 
 
The contrasting picture of Brazilian and Korean technological efforts inferred from the 
 size of their R&D expenditures, as well as from their industry’s engagement in R&D, 
comes out also from their respective commitment of human resources to R&D.  The 
number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D per million inhabitants in Korea 
during 1992 (1,990 researchers) is more than eight times higher than that of Brazil in 
1993 (235 researchers).  Approximately half of the total of Korean researchers were 
working for the private sector (in 1987), whereas only 5.33% per cent of Brazilian 
researchers were found to be working in the private sector. 
 
All those evidences on the size and composition of the two countries’ commitment of 
resources to the technological effort lead to the conclusion that there are strong evidences 
of the predominance of a passive technological learning strategy, i.e., of a Passive 
National Learning System, in Brazil, and of an Active National Learning System in 
Korea. 
 
2.4. The Outcome s of the National Technological Efforts 
 
The evidences gathered about the outcomes of the national technological efforts of both 
countries (seen in Table 7) could reinforce such a conclusion.  Only 14% of the (2,479) 
patents granted by the Brazilian patent office, in 1991, were granted to residents in 
Brazil, whereas, 69% of the (3,741) patents granted, during the same year, by the Korean 
patent office were granted to residents in Korea.  The difference between the patent 
performances of both countries in the US is even greater.  During thirty years (1963-93) 
Brazilian residents were responsible for less than one tenth of a percentage point (0.09%) 
of all the U.S. patents granted to non-residents, and such a share remained relatively 
stable all over that period.  Korean residents’ share of U.S. patents of foreign origin, 
during the same period, was, in average (0.31%) approximately three and a half times 
higher than that of Brazilians.  Furthermore, Koreans’ share showed a strong increasing 
trend.  In 1993 Koreans seized a share (1,73%) more than thirteen times higher than the 
Brazilians (0.13%). 
 
A huge share of the patents that have effective commercial application is, in general, 
comprised of incremental innovations.  As it was shown, there are two types of 
incremental innovations, the passive and the active ones.  There are reasons to believe 
that patents should be much more related to this last type of incremental innovation than 
to the former.  Furthermore, as the first type of incremental innovation is understood to 
be basically the consequence of production experience, and as there is no special reason 
to believe that the Korean production experience is significantly larger than that of Brazil, 
Korean better patent performance should be ascribed mainly to its larger production of 
active incremental innovations.  Therefore, Brazilians’ very poor patenting activity at 
home, as well as in the US, is an additional evidence of the predominance of passive 
learning in its NLS, while the relatively very good patenting performance of Koreans is 
an additional indicator of the active nature of its NLS. 
 
Table 7 
NATIONAL LEARNING SYSTEMS – BRAZIL AND SOUTH KOREA 
Selected Indicators on  
OUTCOMES OF THE NATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL EFFORTS 
 Indicator Brazil South Korea 
National Patents 
National patents granted by the national bureau (1991) 








US patents granted to residents in each country (1993) 
Percentage of US patents granted to non-residents (1963-1993) 









Trade in high-tech products with the US 





Diffusion of new productive technologies 
Robots per million in employment 
 
CADa per million in employment 
 
















Source: Viotti, Eduardo, Passive and Active National Learning Systems, 1997 (Table 13; 15; 17, and 18). 
Notes:  (a) CAD stands for computer aid design workstations. (b) NCMT stands for numerically controlled 
machine tools. Numbers between parentheses indicate the years to which the data corresponds. 
 
 
A similar conclusion could be achieved if one examines the relative size of the U.S. trade 
in advanced technology products with Brazil and Korea.  The value of Korean exports of 
advanced technology products to the U.S. in 1994 (US$ 6,658.40 million) was 57 times 
higher than that of Brazil (US$ 115.8 million).  Korean recent performance in advanced 
technology products is outstanding not only in comparison with Brazil.  Korean exports 
of advanced technology products to the U.S., in 1994, were greater than those of, for 
instance, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and lower only than those of Japan, 
Singapore, Canada and Malaysia (NSB, 1996, p. 254). 
 
Specialization on advanced technology products, especially those related to electronics, 
has two very important meanings.  The first one refers to the fact that those are 
“dynamic” commodities, i.e., commodities for which the growth of international demand 
is above average.  Therefore, such a specialization provides a clear indication of a 
country’s capacity for sustaining the growth of its exports.  The second meaning is 
directly related to the process of technical change, and its consequent productive growth 
and diversification.  Trade specialization on electronic and telecommunication products 
comes with a relatively high level of mastery of information technology, and such a 
technology is at the core of the current technological revolution — the new technological 
paradigm, which is affecting every sector of the economy.  Therefore, the mastery of 
information technology strengthens a country’s overall potential for technological 
development in general (i.e., for technological learning and innovation) and, hence, for 
competition in international markets. 
 
 Korean higher level of mastery of such a technology is, certainly, associated with its 
faster pace of diffusion of some of the most important modern technologies of production 
in manufacture – as robots, computer-aid-design (CAD), and numerically-controlled 
machine-tools (NCMT), as Table 7 shows. 
 
It should be recalled at this point that the more modern the technologies are, the larger the 
opportunities for cumulative incremental innovation (and even for innovation).  
Therefore, the more modern the technology is, the more profitable its adoption could be 
for an active learning strategy.24  Moreover, the information and communication 
technologies, for which there are evidences Korea is doing a relatively successful effort 
for mastering, are at the core of the new techno-economic paradigm and the periods of 
changing of paradigms are seen as historical moments that open up “windows of 
opportunities” for some learners to possibly become innovators (Perez, 1985; Perez and 
Soete, 1988).  Therefore, Korea’s mastery of the technologies of the new paradigm could, 
in the long term, enable Korea to possibly benefit from that extraordinary and temporary 
historical condition that could allow some learning countries to become truly innovators. 
 
Whether there are some evidences that Korea may be headed towards possibly 
overcoming the limits of its current situation of an Active National Learning System, 
Brazil still needs to develop a large effort to just surmount the narrow limits of its 




All the four types of macro-evidences of the technical change processes of Brazil and 
Korea corroborated, directly or indirectly, the hypothesis of the existence of actual cases 
of National Learning Systems of passive and active nature, as it was shown to be, 
respectively, the cases of Brazil and South Korea. 
 
The contrast between the two processes of technical change proved remarkable, despite 
both processes being essentially and still confined to learning.  The concepts of passive 
and active National Learning Systems showed how useful they were to apprehend the 
diversity of those realities, and, consequently, to avoid, for instance, interpretations which 
misleadingly suppose (based on conventional economic theory) that those countries have 
a similar lack of technological dynamism. 25 
 
An inquire on the reasons why the two most successful cases of industrialization in Latin 
America and in the South East constitute National Learning Systems of so different 
natures is not a specific object of this paper.26  In spite of this, it should be advanced here 
                                         
24 See Stiglitz (1987) on “the greater learning potential associated with the newer technologies” and its 
policy implications. 
25 Krugman (1994), trying to dismiss the importance of industrial policy for the East Asian growth 
performance, characterized it as just an “input driven” growth because “ the hypothesis that there has been 
no technical progress during the post-war period cannot be rejected for the four East Asian newly 
industrialized countries” (ibid., p. 71).  The same author attributed to the Brazilian fast growth of the 
1970’s a similar “input driven” nature (Economist 1995). 
26 This issue is, to a certain extent, dealt with in Viotti (1997, Section IV of Chapter 4). 
 the fact that there are strong evidences (Wade 1990; Kim and Dahlman 1992; Amsden 
1993; Amsden and Hikino 1993, and 1994; Kim 1993, and 1997; and Viotti 1997) that 
several aspects of the Korean trade and industrial policies were responsible, to a large 
extent, for building the right set of institutions and stimuli that induced industrial firms’ 
technological dynamism.  This indicates that policies are, to a great extent, responsible 
for the Korean ability to overcome the limits of passive learning, which is the initial and 
natural pattern of technical change of any late industrializing economies.  That also 
suggests that the nature of the National System of Technical Change to which a country 
is attached is not just a matter of fate.  It further suggests that the framework of analysis 
developed in this work could be also helpful for the evaluation and design of policies for 
late industrializing economies. 
 
The use of the framework of analysis associated to the concept of National Innovation 
Systems for the evaluation and design of policies in a passive learning nation, as is the 
case of Brazil, for instance, would probably favor policies targeting essentially at 
innovation.  Those policies will probably be impotent for developing an effective 
innovating system and, even, for fostering an active learning system.  They will most 
likely deepen the observed divorce between the country’s commitment of resources to its 
scientific and technological effort and the effective process of technical change of its 
productive firms. 
 
If a late industrializing country does not wish to remain confined to a backward process 
of technological and economic development, its industrial and technological policies 
should relinquish the concept of industrial firms’ as just technological “buyers”.  Firms 
should be seen (at least potentially) as major players in the process of technical change, 
even though industrial firms from late industrializing countries are not, in principle, 
innovators.  The technological problem of those countries could not be reduced just to a 
question of increasing or improving the “supply” of technologies.  Neither the 
technological problem of firms could be reduced just to the acquisition of technologies.  
Despite being confined to learning, firms should not be appeased with passive learning, 
they could and should strive to become active learners, and possibly creating the basis 
for eventually become innovators. 
 
One of the endeavors of governments, enterprises and societies of late industrializing 
economies in their struggle to overcome their usual backward technological and 
economic development is to build the adequate institutions and create the type of 
environment that induces active learning, i.e., to create an Active National Learning 
System. 
 
Active learning greatly stretches the limits of growth and of the development process of 
late industrializing economies, but it still is a limited process.  The only virtually 
unlimited process of technical change, the only one that empowers a country to 
effectively achieve the status of developed nation (or even to forge ahead) is innovation.  
It is possible to say, then, that only “Schumpeterian development” is compatible with 
successful development, in the post-war sense.  For late industrializing economies, 
however, active learning seems to be a necessary step towards innovation.  As a matter of 
 fact, innovating firms do not necessarily go through an active learning phase; they could 
be born as innovating firms.  However, a historical case of late industrializing economy 
born as innovator is not known.  The only successful case of development of a late 
industrializing economy is Japan, and there are evidences that it went through a phase of 
active learning.  Obviously, the transition from active learning to innovation is not 
certain, and it also depends on historical conditions and on the ability of nations to 
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